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A B S T R A C T
Research on the presidency of the EU shows mixed results.
Although most scholars agree that the EU presidency is not
able to advance its domestic interests in the European forum,
Tallberg (2006) provides evidence for presidency effects. In
the present paper, we empirically estimate presidency-based
power in the Council of the European Union on the DEU data
– a large-scale data set containing EU policy issues from
various policy areas. We show that holding the presidency
does significantly and positively contribute to the bargaining
power of member states, but only in the final stages of
decision-making.
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Introduction
The academic debate on who is powerful in Brussels concentrates on the
relative impact of the European Commission, the European Parliament (EP)
and the Council of the European Union (e.g. Tsebelis and Garrett, 2000; Selck
and Steunenberg, 2004) and the impact of member states on policy outcomes
(Bindseil and Hantke, 1997; Lootsma, 2004). Most scholars agree that the
Council is the most powerful among the three governmental institutions of
the European Union (EU) (Westlake, 1995; Cini, 1996; Hayes-Renshaw and
Wallace, 1997). At face value, one would thus expect the presidency of the
Council to have additional leverage in EU policy-making. Nevertheless, the
scarce literature addressing the power of the EU presidency suggests that
member states at the helm cannot exert more influence, or even have less
influence, compared with other member states (Schout, 1998).
Officially, the presidency is expected to be impartial (Tallberg, 2006).
Accordingly, the literature emphasizes the presidency’s role as a neutral
broker and negotiation facilitator. Although authors recognize that member
states holding the presidency pursue their domestic agendas, the degree of
their success is considered to be low (Bassompierre, 1988; Westlake, 1995; Cini,
1996; Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace, 1997; Sherrington, 2000). Several argu-
ments sustain this view. First, the relatively short period at the helm narrows
the scope of what can be done. Since a member state is chair for only six
months and the bargaining process is slow, only a limited number of domestic
objectives can be pursued.1 Second, the lion’s share of the presidency’s time
and resources are spent on administrative tasks – the ongoing Council
business. These tasks are not directly related to influencing policy outcomes
(Kirchner, 1992). Third, the presidency is often faced with external events that
require immediate attention. Fourth, the presidency is hampered by policy
inheritance: policies that have been set out prior to a member state’s presi-
dency term are hard to reverse. Fifth, the formal powers of the presidency, in
terms of agenda-setting and veto power, are limited.
A final reason for a toothless presidency is the existing ‘culture of
consensus’ (Van Schendelen, 1996; Mattila and Lane, 2001). Indeed, decision-
making in the European Union is often characterized by intensive negotiations
and compromises (Sherrington, 2000; Thomson et al., 2006). A culture of
consensus constrains presidency behaviour, because other member states will
keep it to its expected neutrality and its role as a welder of integrationist policy
solutions. Thus, presidencies may be forced to spend resources to further
Community interests and strengthen their reputation.
One author challenges the well-established view of the toothless presi-
dency. Tallberg (2006) develops a theory of formal leadership and presidency
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power, grounded in rational choice institutionalism (Shepsle, 1989;
Aspinwall and Schneider, 2000). His main thesis is that the rules, norms and
procedures that constitute the institutional framework provide the presi-
dency with asymmetric access to information and asymmetric control over
the negotiation procedure vis-à-vis other member states. These advantages
can and will be brought into play, not only to ensure efficient EU bargain-
ing, but also to advance the presidency’s domestic interests. Tallberg (2006)
relies on descriptive case studies to support his argument.
In this article we will try to shed some light on the puzzle of presidency
power. We study the ability of individual member states to influence policy
outcomes. We aim at finding out whether member states holding the presi-
dency can exert more influence on policy outcomes than expected on the basis
of their formal voting power. By recognizing that the bargaining process in
the EU is a relay race – it typically involves multiple presidencies that hand
over leadership over the negotiations every six months – we try to locate the
stage in the bargaining process where presidency power is largest.
We apply a cooperative bargaining model and estimate parameters for
presidential bargaining strength using the ‘Decision making in the European
Union’ (DEU) data set (see Thomson et al., 2006). This data set consists of 162
controversial policy issues, nested in 66 Commission proposals. The issues
are selected over various policy areas, such as Agriculture and the Internal
Market, and subject to either qualified majority voting (QMV) or unanimity
under the co-decision and consultation procedures. The large number of cases
used in the data set allows for more general conclusions about presidency
power than has previously been possible.
Presidency power in different stages of involvement
EU bargaining is a complex process. Before policy proposals become
legislation, they go back and forth between the Commission, the Council and
the Parliament, which can amend, reject, delay and accept proposals under
different institutional procedures and decision rules (Hix, 2005: 100–1; Wallace
and Wallace, 2000: 11–22). It follows that bargaining over a policy proposal is
a time-consuming and path-dependent process, involving multiple presi-
dencies. Hence, we propose a stage model of the EU bargaining process 
that allows us to discriminate between the different mechanisms behind 
presidency power. The stage model distinguishes between four stages of
presidency involvement, based on two important events in EU decision-
making: (a) the adoption of a Commission proposal, and (b) the formal
decision of the Council.
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A schematic representation of the bargaining process is presented in
Figure 1. The stages represent four intervals that may overlap: for any
proposal, the date of adoption and date of the final decision are known, and
presidencies are backwardly assigned to intervals around these two reference
points.2 Except for the intermediate presidency stage (I), each interval is
maximally six months and involves one presidency. The pre-adoption stage
(PA) defines the presidency that was in office before the presidency under
which the Commission adopted a proposal. The latter is the adoption stage
(A) presidency. Subsequent intermediate stage presidencies (I) have their
term(s) between stage A and the final voting stage (D). The presidency in
stage D reaches a final decision in the Council.
We distinguish between two key processes that may yield additional
powers to presidencies. The first process concerns the decentralized nego-
tiations in the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) and the
Commission during agenda-setting and the adoption of Commission pro-
posals. The second process is centralized bargaining among ministers in the
Council during the voting stage. When presidencies have a specific advantage
in both processes over other member states to further their domestic goals, the
following hypothesis holds.
Hypothesis 1 (Presidency Effect Hypothesis): Member states holding the presi-
dency are better able than other member states to realize policy outcomes close
to their policy position.
We now briefly discuss the mechanisms that could account for the
additional power of presidencies in decentralized agenda-setting, centralized
bargaining and voting. With respect to decentralized agenda-setting, Tallberg
(2003, 2006) argues that Presidents are formal leaders in the European Union
and able to manage the policy agenda. He distinguishes between three
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   t0    t1 A  D PA  I
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6 months 6 months 
Figure 1 Stages of presidency involvement in the EU bargaining process.
Notes: PA = pre-adoption stage; A = adoption stage; I = intermediate stage; D = voting stage. 
categories of agenda management: agenda-setting, agenda-structuring and
agenda exclusion (Tallberg, 2003). Agenda-setting refers to the right to initiate
proposals. Although formal agenda-setting power in the EU lies with the
Commission, Tallberg argues that the presidency can: (1) raise awareness of
problems, and convince the Commission to take action, (2) develop specific
proposals for action, and (3) develop policy initiatives in areas where actor
configurations are as yet unclear or undefined – for example by drawing up
a ‘Presidency program’ (Tallberg, 2003: 7). By adopting a proposal close to the
President’s position, the Commission maximizes the probability that a
proposal will pass, because the presidency is likely not only to put it on the
agenda but also to devote more resources to striking a bargain. Lobbying
efforts may thus induce the Commission to adopt proposals that are favour-
able to the presidency. If these mechanisms are at work, the following
hypothesis holds.
Hypothesis 2 (Adoption Stage Presidency Hypothesis): The member state that
holds the presidency in the adoption stage is better able to realize a policy outcome
close to its policy position than are member states that hold the presidency in the
preceding pre-adoption stage and member states that hold the presidency in the
subsequent intermediate stage.
With respect to centralized bargaining in the Council, the presidency is
able to structure the agenda of Council meetings. In these meetings, the issues
that underlie policy proposals adopted by the Commission are discussed. The
presidency determines the sequence in which proposals and issues are
discussed and the methods of decision-making, such as competing proposals
versus single negotiation texts (Tallberg, 2003). In addition, the presidency
determines the frequency of Council meetings. Finally, the presidency has the
right to exclude unfavourable proposals from the Council agenda – at least
for its period at the helm.
In addition to agenda management, the presidency takes the initiative
in proposing compromise solutions to the Council, i.e. amendments of, or
alternatives to, the Commission proposal – the so-called ‘Presidency compro-
mise’ (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace, 1997; Nicoll, 1998; Tallberg, 2006). It is
reasonable to assume that the presidency will propose among those possible
compromise solutions the one closest to its own policy position. These
mechanisms would lead to the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3 (Voting Stage Presidency Hypothesis): Member states that hold the
presidency in the voting stage are better able to realize a policy outcome close to
their policy position than are member states that hold the presidency in the inter-
mediate stage.
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A cooperative bargaining model of Council decision-making
Policy outcomes depend on the nature of the bargaining process. We assume
that cooperative bargaining takes place in the Council. Cooperative bargaining
may be promoted by the existence of highly inclusive voting rules. Decisions
are often taken unanimously, even when only a qualified majority is needed
(Mattila and Lane, 2001; Thomson et al., 2006). The norm of consensus is
strong among actors in the European Union. Inclusive voting rules and a long
shadow of the future could result in tough, non-cooperative bargaining
(Fearon, 1988; Scharpf, 1988). However, if these rules are combined with the
existence of a threat point that is undesirable to all member states, these
member states have a strong incentive to cooperate (Achen, 2006). The exist-
ence of an undesirable threat point has been found consistently in case studies
(Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace, 1997). Finally, cooperative bargaining models
are better suited to study decision-making situations that are highly informal
and complex (Achen, 2006: 97).3
Collective decision-making in the European Union is assumed to con-
centrate on a set of policy proposals. These are negotiation texts adopted by
the European Commission, which address a certain topic in a certain policy
area. Each proposal comprises j policy issues ( j = 1, 2, . . . , n). Each issue
consists of a set of policy alternatives Xj. A policy alternative of issue j is
denoted by aj (aj = 1j, 2j, . . . , vj), where vj is the number of alternatives of
issue j. As is the case in many spatial models of decision-making (e.g.
Crombez, 2000), it is assumed that these policy alternatives can be ordered
on a single dimension. In our case, each alternative falls in the interval 
[0, 100], as a point on a one-dimensional policy scale. Variable xj ∈ [0, 100] is
a policy scale variable, representing the values of issue j’s policy alternatives.
We apply the model to the period 1999–2001, before the accession of 10
new member states. Hence, the actors include 15 member states, the European
Commission and the European Parliament, denoted by i (i = 1, 2, . . . , 17).
These actors take policy positions on each issue j, which is the policy alterna-
tive initially most preferred and expressed just after the adoption of a
proposal by the European Commission. The policy positions of actors i on
issues j are denoted by xij ∈ Xj and are points on the policy scale. Actors are
assumed to behave rationally and negotiate a policy outcome as close to their
policy position as possible. The policy outcome is denoted by Oj, where
Oj ∈ Xj. The utility functions of the actors are assumed to be single-peaked
and monotonically decreasing, which means that the larger the distance
between the outcome and the initially preferred policy position, the more
utility loss an actor experiences.
The final policy outcome is supposed to depend on (1) the power of actors,
(2) their salience and (3) the nature of the bargaining process. In this analysis,
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power is defined as the sum of resources that can be used by an actor to move
the policy outcome on an issue towards the desired outcome. The power of
actor i on issue j is denoted by wij ∈ [0, 1]. Power plays a central role here,
for it is on this concept that we evaluate the presidency against other member
states. The basic idea is that the institutional features associated with the presi-
dency may constitute power resources additional to those usually identified,
such as formal voting power, reputation and expertise (Torenvlied, 2000;
Bailer, 2004).
The policy outcome will also depend on the relative salience a member
state attaches to different issues. Given the limited amount of time and
resources that can be spent on gathering information and bargaining, member
states assign different priorities to issues. Salience is the fraction of the power
a member state is willing to utilize to bring the policy outcome closer to its
preferred position (Bueno de Mesquita and Stokman, 1994; Arregui et al.,
2004). The salience of actor i on issue j is denoted by sij ∈ [0, 100].
The cooperative bargaining model we apply is a weighted version of the
mean voter model (Caplin and Nalebuff, 1991). The general underlying
assumption of the model is that all actors are willing to shift their positions
to a policy outcome that takes all their divergent interests into account. The
mean policy position weighted by actors’ power and salience is a first-order
approximation of the Nash bargaining solution (NBS) in cooperative game
theory (Nash, 1950).4 This is true only when the threat point – the policy
outcome that prevails when no agreement is reached – is far less desirable
than any outcome for all member states (Achen, 2006). The NBS predicts
Pareto-optimal outcomes on one-dimensional issues by maximizing the
product of the actors’ quadratic utility functions.
The weighted mean voter model in equation (1) predicts the outcome on
issue j (Oj) by the mean of the positions (xij) of all actors, weighted by the
product of their power (wij) and salience (sij) (Van den Bos, 1991):
(1)
Testing for presidency power
A starting point for analysing the power of the presidency is the impact the
presidency has on the outcomes of cooperative bargaining. Since we wish to
investigate the presidency’s power to advance domestic interests, a member
state’s power should be made conditional upon whether or not it holds the
presidency on an issue. We model this by multiplying wij by a scale factor αij
O
x s w
s w
j
ij ij ij
i
ij ij
i
=
=
=
∑
∑
1
17
1
17
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when member state i holds the presidency, and retain wij as the power score
when member state i does not hold the presidency. Scale factor αij represents
additional power (αij > 1) or reduction in power (αij < 1) owing to the presi-
dency. We will present different models for αij that differ by the explanatory
variables entered in a log-linear model for alpha. A few examples are
discussed below. To test the presidency effect hypothesis (H1), we include
only one unknown parameter β for a dummy variable that indicates whether
or not a member state holds the presidency in the bargaining process. Values
for all other variables in the model are known, including the outcome Oj. If
positive, β indicates that member states holding the presidency have the
ability to realize policy outcomes close to their policy position in addition to
the power they would exercise when they do not hold the presidency. A
negative sign of β indicates that the power of member states is reduced during
their presidency term. Hence, β is an overall measure of presidency power.
Because negative power has no clear interpretation and member states will
not harm their interests without clear reasons, we assume that wij is not
negative. Thus, we carry out a logistic transformation on α and obtain the
following model in equation (2):
(2)
where:
log(αij) = βPij
Pij = 1 if member state i holds the presidency on issue j; Pij = 0 otherwise.
Two interpretable results follow from this model. First, if the presidency
is influential, this model should lead to more accurate predictions of the policy
outcomes than the weighted mean voter model. Second, at the parameter
level, a positive effect of β would indicate that the presidency’s policy position
has a larger weight in determining the policy outcome. The presidency effect
hypothesis (H1) can now be restated more formally as follows: H1: β > 0.
The model can be extended to account for the specific presidency power
in different stages of the bargaining process:
log(αij) = β1PijPA + β2PijA + β3PijI + β4PijD
For each stage, Pij
PA, Pij
A, Pij
I , Pij
D = 1 if member state i holds the presidency in
the respective stage (the pre-adoption, the adoption, the intermediate, and
the final voting stage). Pij
PA, Pij
A, Pij
I , Pij
D = 0 otherwise.
O
x s w a
s w a
ej
ij ij ij ij
i
ij ij ij
i
j= +
=
=
∑
∑
1
17
1
17
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On the basis of this model, the adoption stage presidency hypothesis (H2)
can be restated as H2: β2 > β1, β3, and the voting stage presidency hypothesis
(H3) as H3: β4 > β3.
Research design and data
The hypotheses are tested using data on 66 legislative Commission proposals
from the first pillar of EU decision-making. This ‘Community’ pillar covers
the larger share of EU policy-making, including the Internal Market and Agri-
culture. The data collection was coordinated by the DEU research team and
published in several contributions (e.g. Stokman and Thomson, 2004;
Thomson et al., 2006). The selected proposals are a comprehensive selection
of proposals that meet a number of criteria. First, the data set contains
proposals that were subject to the consultation or to the co-decision
procedure. Second, it contains proposals discussed in the Council in the
period 1999–2000. All final decision outcomes were reached in the period
1999–2001, and the proposals did not change procedure after the Amsterdam
Treaty came into effect in 1999 (with one exception that was finalized in the
first term of 1998). The time that a proposal is ‘pending’ between adoption
by the Commission and the final decision outcome varies between 3 and 68
months in the data set. Third, the proposals were selected on the basis of a
certain degree of controversy. A random sample of Commission proposals
would lead to an overrepresentation of relatively unimportant, technical
issues on which member states take similar positions. This would reduce the
ability to discriminate between powerful and less powerful actors in the
decision-making process. An important condition for controversy of a pro-
posal was that it must have appeared in Agence Europe, an independent 
daily news service covering EU affairs. These criteria resulted in the col-
lection of 66 proposals covering a broad range of policy areas (Thomson 
et al., 2006).
For each Commission proposal, experts were asked to identify issues
around which decision-making took place. An issue could be constructed if
at least some of the actors have opposing positions, if the issue represents a
one-dimensional continuum and if the points on the continuum represent
alternative policy outcomes (Thomson and Stokman, 2003). The experts
identified 162 issues within the 66 proposals. Of the 162 issues, 4 have missing
values on at least one of the explanatory variables. In 6 cases, the presidency
in the adoption stage is the same as the presidency in the voting stage, i.e.
these issues were adopted and decided upon within one presidency term of
six months. Because these few cases would (arguably) induce interaction
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effects between stages, we excluded them from the analyses. Ultimately, 152
issues nested in 61 proposals are included in the following analyses.
The dependent variable in our analyses is the policy outcome on each
issue, identified by the experts and assigned a value on the policy scale. If an
issue is dichotomous, the policy outcome is either one of the two policy
alternatives. The independent variables in the models are actors’ initially
preferred policy positions, their salience and power, and a variable indicat-
ing whether a member state holds the presidency. Initially preferred policy
positions and salience are also operationalized by expert judgements. Again,
these are congruent with the possible policy alternatives, and salience may
take any value between 0 and 100, with higher levels indicating stronger
commitment to an issue by a member state.
Retrospective bias in expert judgements was reduced through several
procedures (Thomson et al., 2006). First, most of the experts were closely
affiliated with the permanent representations of the member states, e.g. desk
officers representing their state in Council discussions. Others were affiliated
with the Commission, the EP or interest groups. In total 150 interviews were
held with 125 experts. These were in-depth interviews lasting for 1 hour and
40 minutes on average, to make it possible to evaluate experts’ effort and
expertise. Moreover, the experts were asked to consider specific policy issues
rather than abstract dimensions (e.g. pro- and anti-European), which reduces
the likelihood that experts use different criteria for their judgements 
(Budge, 2000).
Power is defined as the sum of resources that can be used by an actor to
move the policy outcome on an issue towards the desired outcome. Studies
on bargaining typically take formal voting power as the cornerstone in their
analyses, using a voting power index.5 The Shapley–Shubik Index (SSI)
figures predominantly among these: power is defined by the number of times
an actor is pivotal over all permutations of the actor set (Shapley and Shubik,
1954). There are doubts about the usefulness of this index. Most importantly,
it fails to take into account the preferences of the actors and the impact of
certain procedural settings on power (Garrett and Tsebelis, 1999; Schneider
et al., 2004). The SSI considers all permutations to be equally likely, whereas
some coalitions simply cannot be formed owing to opposing preferences. The
DEU data set includes SSI scores for four different procedural conditions: the
co-decision procedure with either the QMV or unanimity voting rule in the
Council, and the consultation procedure with either QMV or unanimity.6
The independent variable of central concern is a dummy that indicates
whether a member state holds the presidency, and a series of (mutually
exclusive) dummies related to the different bargaining stages. Table 1 shows
the distribution of proposals and issues over the presidency terms in the DEU
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data. The Commission adopted most proposals in the presidency terms of
Austria, Finland, Germany and the United Kingdom, and most were finalized
by Finland, Portugal, France, Sweden and Belgium.
Results
Policy distances
Table 2 displays a first indication of presidency power. For each member state,
the mean distance over all issues is calculated between the policy position
and (1) the Commission’s position, (2) the weighted mean voter prediction,
and (3) the actual policy outcome. The distance to the Commission gives an
indication of how successful the lobbying efforts of an actor could have been.
The closer a member state’s policy position to the Commission’s position, the
more the Commission’s position reflects the position of the member state. The
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Table 1 Distribution of policy proposals and policy issues (in brackets) over
presidencies and bargaining stages
Year/ Development Adoption Intermediate Voting 
half Presidency stage stage stage stage
1995–2 Spain 6 (17) 0 (0) 0 (0) (0)
1996–1 Italy 1 (2) 6 (17) 0 (0) 0 (0)
1996–2 Ireland 0 (0) 1 (2) 6 (17) 0 (0)
1997–1 Netherlands 2 (4) 0 (0) 7 (19) 0 (0)
1997–2 Luxembourg 7 (22) 2 (4) 7 (19) 0 (0)
1998–1 United Kingdom 10 (23) 7 (22) 9 (23) 1 (1)
1998–2 Austria 8 (13) 10 (23) 15 (44) 0 (0)
1999–1 Germany 19 (44) 8 (13) 20 (56) 5 (11)
1999–2 Finland 5 (17) 19 (44) 16 (44) 11 (25)
2000–1 Portugal 3 (10) 5 (17) 27 (70) 10 (22)
2000–2 France 0 (0) 3 (10) 17 (50) 14 (33)
2001–1 Sweden 0 (0) 0 (0) 8 (26) 11 (33)
2001–2 Belgium 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 9 (27)
Total 61 (152) 61 (152) 132 (364) 61 (152)
Number of member states 
holding the presidency 9 9 10 7
Source: DEU data set (Thomson and Stokman, 2003).
Notes: Included are 61 selected Commission proposals discussed in the Council in the period
1999–2001. 
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distance to the weighted mean voter prediction indicates how central an actor
is in the policy space. It is useful to analyse whether presidencies in one 
stage or the other have more central positions in the policy space, because
centrality enhances their opportunities for success (Bailer, 2004). Finally, the
distance of an actor’s policy position to the policy outcome is a measure of
preference loss suffered from the collective outcome (Torenvlied, 1996).
There are 152 observations for each actor and 17 actors within each issue,
accumulating to 2584 observations. Table 2 groups these observations accord-
ing to the different bargaining stages. The mean distances are calculated for
each group, excluding the 152 observations for the Commission when calcu-
lating the mean distance to the Commission’s position. The percentage of
observations for which the distance was minimal (0) and maximal (100) is also
displayed. Distributions of distances are highly skewed: many observations
have extreme values, with distances being either minimal or maximal.7
If lobbying is an important source of power for the presidency, we should
observe small distances between the Commission’s position and the policy
positions of pre-adoption and adoption stage presidencies. Table 2 shows that
this is not the case: the mean distances are not smaller compared with the
mean distance of non-presidency member states. Other member states are
equally likely to have their position reflected by the Commission in the pre-
adoption and adoption stages.
Turning to the centrality of presidencies in different stages of the bargain-
ing process, Table 2 suggests that no group of presidencies is close to the
weighted mean voter prediction. The mean distances to the weighted mean
voter prediction are considerable for each bargaining stage and not different
from the non-presidency group of observations. Hence, we can be confident
that a result of presidency power will not be an artefact of centrality in the
policy space.
The mean distances to the policy outcome are an indication of the
preference loss that presidencies suffer in the different bargaining stages. There
are two main conclusions to be drawn here. The mean distances to the policy
outcome are largest for presidencies in the intermediate stage, indicating that
they are indeed less powerful than adoption and voting stage presidencies.
Second, the mean distances to the policy outcome are smallest for voting stage
presidencies as compared with both non-presidencies and other presidency
types. This suggests that voting stage presidencies are more powerful.
Parameter estimation
We test our three hypotheses by fitting three regression models with the presi-
dency weights as the only unknown parameter. The first regression model is
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an empty baseline model, with log(αij) = 0, or αij = 1 for all member states
in all issues. In the second regression model log(α) is modelled as a function
of dummy predictor P, indicating whether a member state holds the presi-
dency in any stage or not at all. Thus, β < 0 implies that the weight of a
member state’s position decreases (i.e. α = e(β) < 1) when it holds the
presidency in any stage (the reverse holds when β > 0). This allows us to test
the presidency effect hypothesis. In the third model, four dummy variables
are entered into the regression equation, each indicating whether a member
state holds the presidency in a specific stage, with PPA for the pre-adoption
stage, PA for the adoption stage, PI for the intermediate stage, and PD for the
voting stage. This model allows us to test the adoption and voting stage
hypotheses.
The weighted mean voter model includes the parameters βm in a non-
linear way. We therefore fitted the models using non-linear regression
techniques with maximum likelihood estimation. Issues are nested in pro-
posals, and thus we adjusted for the clustering of issues in proposals with the
cluster-adjusted sandwich estimates of variance (Rogers, 1993). This cluster-
ing makes the log-likelihood tests for model comparison inappropriate, since
they no longer follow a chi-squared distribution. Hence, we use the Wald test
for model comparison, based on the estimated standard error of the residuals.
Although not a strong statistical test, a large reduction in the standard error
of the residuals implies a better fit of the model. Additionally, we examine the
mean errors of the predictions to evaluate the relative accuracy of the models.
Table 3 reports the exponents of the regression parameters of the three
models. These exponents represent the number by which the weight of a
member state’s position is multiplied in the specific model. The baseline mean
voter model reproduces the results found by Thomson et al. (2006). They
report a mean absolute error of 23. We find a mean error of 23.2 and this
results from a slight difference in the number of issues (Thomson et al., 2006,
used 162).
The presidency model contains a parameter for holding the presidency
anywhere in the bargaining process (P), and provides a direct test of the pres-
idency effect hypothesis. The parameter is larger than 1, which means that
there is additional presidency power, but the effect is not significant. Overall,
presidencies do not seem to realize policy outcomes closer to their preferred
position than ‘ordinary’ member states do. The mean error of the predictions
is 0.1 point larger than the mean error of the baseline model, indicating a
slight reduction in model accuracy.
When we move our analysis to presidencies in different bargaining
stages, we observe that voting stage presidencies are significantly more
powerful than non-presidency member states. The size of the effect is
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considerable. The SSI scores have a range of [0,1], and a multiplication of this
weight by 4.88 is impressive. The voting stage presidency hypothesis is thus
strongly corroborated. Adoption stage presidencies, on the other hand, are
not significantly more powerful than pre-adoption stage and intermediate
stage presidencies. Thus, the adoption stage presidency hypothesis needs to
be rejected. The weights for presidencies in the first stages of the bargaining
process do not differ from those for ordinary member states in those stages.
This is confirmed by testing the joint significance of the parameters for the
first three stages (χ2(df = 3) = 1.57, p = .67). Overall, model predictions are
not much more accurate than the baseline predictions. The mean error
decreases by 0.4. Thus, the inclusion of presidency power parameters only
marginally reduces the model errors.
We performed a number of additional analyses to check whether the presi-
dency effects found in the presidency stage model remain stable if we include
more complex assumptions about the mechanisms underlying presidency
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Table 3 Non-linear regression analysis of policy outcomes discussed in the Council
in the period 1999–2001
Presidency Presidency stage 
Baseline model model
Variable model e(β) e(β)
Presidencies
Presidency (P) 1.84
(.75)
Pre-adoption stage (PPA) 1.35
(.20)
Adoption stage (PA) 1.12
(.04)
Intermediate stage (P I) 1.65
(.75)
Voting stage (PD) 4.88***
(1.79)
Standard deviation of residuals 30.97 30.88 30.57
Wald test 1.79 10.31**
Mean error 23.2 23.3 22.8
Na 152 152 152
Notes: Sandwich estimates for standard errors, adjusted for clustering of issues in proposals;
exponents of parameters and standard errors reported. 
a 152 policy issues are nested in 61 Commission proposals. 
* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01 (two-sided).
power. First, we investigated for all bargaining stages whether the presidency’s
power is affected by the degree of salience. Considering the limited amount
of time available to a presidency, it can be expected to mobilize its resources
specifically on those issues that are more salient. We included parameters for
interaction effects between all presidencies and their level of salience. Initially,
we found a positive and significant interaction effect for voting stage presi-
dencies (e(β) = 1.06, p = .09), meaning that, as salience increases, power
increases. However, the effect is oddly large and significant only at the .10
level, probably owing to estimation problems. Including only the interaction
for voting stage presidencies yielded non-significant results.
Furthermore, we tested whether it is the powerful member states that are
responsible for an increase in power when they become President. For all
stages we included an interaction effect with the voting weight (wij). If presi-
dency power increases as voting power increases, we would conclude that
powerful member states in particular benefit from holding the presidency
office. The opposite may also be true, since powerful member states could be
watched more closely by other member states when they hold the presidency.
None of the interaction effects for the different bargaining stages were
significant.
Finally, we tested whether the distance between the policy position of the
President and the Commission’s position affects the power of presidencies in
the pre-adoption and adoption bargaining stages. The power of adoption stage
presidencies does not increase or decrease as a result of an increase in the
distance to the Commission’s position (e(β) = .97, p = .44), nor does the
power of pre-adoption stage presidencies (e(β) = 1.05, p = .21). We thus
conclude that agreement with the Commission does not reinforce the effects
of presidency power.8
We also tested for the robustness of our results. This is important,
considering the limitations of the data set in terms of the available distribution
of presidencies over the selected issues and the limited time frame of the
study. It could well be the case that, coincidentally, some tough issues were
assigned to a specific presidency. It could also be the case that idiosyncrasies
of specific presidencies, for example the personality of the political leader,
affected bargaining power rather than the institution of the presidency. Tests
for the amount of unexplained variance at the member state level run into
identification problems, as well as regressions that include control variables
at the member state level. Consequently, we used a more informal test for
robustness: we fitted the presidency stage model seven times, each time
excluding all issues under the presidency term of one of the seven member
states in the voting stage. Most conspicuously, the voting stage presidency
effect increases from 4.88 (p < .01; n = 152) to 7.02 (p < .005; n = 119) when
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the 33 issues for France are excluded. Excluding the issues for the other 
voting stage presidencies yielded small increases in power in all cases. Only
excluding the 33 issues for Sweden yielded a decrease in power for voting
stage presidencies from 4.88 (p < .01; n = 152) to 2.48 (p = .31; n = 119).
Apparently, Sweden was a highly effective voting stage presidency, whereas
France was the least effective for the Council decisions under study.
We ran a number of other checks for robustness of our results. First, we
repeated the model estimations for the presidency stage model 61 times,
leaving one proposal out of the analysis each time, to test for outliers and idio-
syncrasies of issues. This did not change the results. We excluded dichotomous
issues from the regression analyses because these would arguably violate
assumptions of normality and continuous dependent variables. Parameters
did not change significance, except for the pre-adoption stage presidencies,
whose parameter became significant although smaller than for voting stage
presidencies (e(β) = 3.47, p < .05). The mean errors of all models decreased.9
Finally, we used an expert-assigned power score of the member states as an
alternative to the SSI power indices. The same results were obtained for all
parameters.
Discussion and conclusion
In this paper, we have made a first attempt to examine the power of the presi-
dency of the Council of the European Union using a large-scale quantitative
data set. We tested presidency effects on policy outcomes using a cooperative
bargaining model of decision-making. It proved useful to discriminate
between the power of presidencies at different stages of the bargaining
process. We partly rejected the view of the ‘toothless’ presidency. We were
able to show that it does not pay to hold the presidency in the earlier stages
of bargaining, when decentralized lobbying is the prominent way of exerting
influence on policy outcomes. Instead, our analysis showed that presidencies
in the more centralized voting stage can leave a domestic mark on EU policy
outcomes. Independent of country size and economic power – on which
formal voting power is based – presidencies in the voting stage have
additional leverage in EU decision-making compared with other member
states.
Our conclusions should be seen as a starting point in understanding the
effects of the EU presidency. Some shortcomings in the data and analysis must
be taken into account. Most importantly, the sample of Commission pro-
posals is a selected sample. Statistical generalization to decision-making in
the first pillar is not possible. Furthermore, the selection implies that
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Commission proposals reached a final decision in the period 1999–2001,
thereby disregarding those proposals that were never finalized. We do not
know anything about the number of proposals that never became legislation
and the distribution of these proposals over presidencies. This is of major
concern because agenda exclusion could be an important power tool for
presidencies. If many proposals never become adopted, we may have under-
estimated the power of adoption stage presidencies vis-à-vis presidencies in
later bargaining stages.10
There are a few more reasons to believe that the additional power of
presidencies we found is a conservative estimate. First, the DEU data set
includes proposals only in the first pillar of EU decision-making. One may
argue that in the pillars of Common Foreign and Security Policy and Justice
and Home Affairs the presidency has more opportunities to influence policy
outcomes – particularly because it enjoys formal agenda-setting power (Hix,
2005). Second, if EU bargaining is characterized less by cooperation and more
by tough, non-cooperative bargaining, the presidency can be expected to
employ its procedural and informational advantages with even more success.
Thus, we have confidence that the presidency effect we report here is a
genuine characteristic of EU policy-making.
But the problem remains of confounding factors that might exist at the
level of the member state. Size, experience, informal reputation in the Council,
level of preparation of the presidency term, or even the personality of politi-
cal leaders could all account for the effects we found. A proper test for the
existence of such effects would require larger, longitudinal data sets that also
incorporate precise information about the agenda-setting process. That would
be the avenue for further quantitative research.
Notes
We thank three anonymous reviewers for their useful suggestions and comments.
1 The six-month rotation system was confirmed until 2006. After the Finnish
presidency in the second half of 2006, a rotating ‘team presidency’ consisting
of three member states will preside over the Council for 1.5 years.
2 In the data set we find an overlapping presidency for only one case.
3 Indeed, empirical studies confirm the absence of stable coalitions in the EU
(Thomson et al., 2004) that could consistently beat other member states.
Moreover, a cooperative (weighted mean voter) bargaining model has been
tested on the DEU data before and has been found to give the most accurate
predictions evaluated against a range of other cooperative and non-
cooperative decision models (Thomson et al., 2006). For inclusive decision
rules, the weighted mean is a better predictor in comparison with the median.
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Thomson and Torenvlied (2005) tested the predictions of the mean and
median voter models over a large pooled data set of controversial issues –
with an over-sample of DEU issues – in various political settings. They found
that, when the decision rule is qualified majority voting (QMV), the simple
mean is the best predictor, whereas under unanimity the mean weighted by
the power and salience of the actors performs best. Since all decision-making
in the EU is subject to either QMV or unanimity, the (weighted) mean seems
to be appropriate.
4 The mean voter position weighted by actors’ capabilities and salience was first
used in an empirical analysis of EU decision-making by Van den Bos (1991).
5 For an overview of some applications using voting power indices, see 
Felsenthal and Machover (1995). An application on EU decision-making is
Kandogan (2000).
6 The Commission is always included as a member of the winning coalition
under both the co-decision and the consultation procedures. Under co-
decision with QMV voting in the Council, the winning coalition consists of
the Commission, a qualified majority of member states and the EP. Under
consultation with QMV voting in the Council, the winning coalition consists
of the Commission and a qualified majority of member states. In effect, the
Parliament’s power is zero under consultation, and the Commission’s power
is largest under QMV in the Council. We emphasize that the approach here
would in principle allow us to treat the power wi of the member states as
parameters to be estimated, rather than to be assumed by SSI. Since the
amount of data that we have is limited, we abstained from this method.
7 This is mainly owing to the inclusion of dichotomous issues.
8 Table 2 also showed that the distance of voting stage presidencies to the
Commission’s position was smaller compared with non-presidencies. Adding
an interaction parameter for the voting stage to the presidency stage model,
however, also did not show significant results (e(β) = 1.02, p = .13).
9 For the baseline, presidency and presidency stage models the mean errors
were 20.65, 20.25 and 19.80 respectively. The presidency stage model is still
a significant improvement on the baseline model (Wald(4) = 20.25, p < .001).
10 This is also under the assumption that the presidency’s policy positions on
the issues in these proposals are far away from the expected policy outcome.
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